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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TWELVE ANGRY PEOPLE. ARKANSAS
CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE
PERSONS IN CRIMINAL CASES. BYRD V. STATE, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d
435 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a trial by jury for criminal defendants is guaranteed under
both the Arkansas Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.
This right is generally understood to provide for a common-law jury.
Although the origin of the common-law jury is subject to debate, it is
beyond question that it consisted of a panel of twelve people.'
In Byrd v. State,2 the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the noted
constitutional commentator, Justice Joseph Story, that a jury should be
composed of twelve people.' The court held that Act 592 of 1993,' which
allowed six jurors in misdemeanor cases, violated the Arkansas Constitution.
Unless the constitution is amended, all criminal defendants in Arkansas may
rest assured they will be guaranteed a common-law jury of twelve persons
who must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.5
This casenote considers the facts, background, and relevance of Byrd
v. State. Part II is a brief consideration of the facts underlying the opinion.
Part III is a discussion of the background of the law relating to the number
of jurors in criminal cases. This note considers the number of jurors
required by the United States Constitution, the holdings of sister-state courts
interpreting similar state constitutional provisions, and the earlier holdings
of the Arkansas Supreme Court considering the number of jurors required
by the Arkansas Constitution. Part IV presents an analysis of the court's
i. Many early authorities seemingly accept this number without question. See, e.g.,
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *352, where the author
wrote: "When the trial is called on, the jurors are to be sworn, as they appear, to the number
of twelve, unless they are challenged by the party." For a thorough discussion of the history
of the common-law jury, see generally WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
(1852).
2. 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).
3. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1779 (3d ed. 1858). Justice Story wrote:
[A] trial by jury is generally understood to mean, ex vi termini, a trial by a jury
of twelve men, impartially selected, who must unanimously concur in the guilt of
the accused before a legal conviction can be had. Any law therefore, dispensing
with any of these requisites, may be considered unconstitutional.
Id.
4. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, No. 592, 2 Ark. Acts 1748 (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202, -203 (Michie 1994)).
5. Both unanimity and the requirement of twelve jurors seem to be intertwined




reasoning in Byrd. Finally, Part V concludes the note with a discussion of
the significance of the court's opinion.
II. FACTS
Michael Wayne Byrd was arrested on December 10, 1992, for first
offense driving while intoxicated (DWI), after the arresting officer saw him
swerving back and forth and driving across the center line.6 Byrd was tried
and found guilty in a bench trial in the Prairie Grove Municipal Court.7 He
appealed to the Washington County Circuit Court, where he received a new
trial before a jury.8 The court informed Byrd that it would impanel a six-
person jury.9 Byrd objected to the six-person jury and requested a jury
panel of twelve persons. 0 The trial court overruled Byrd's objection and
impaneled only six jurors." The six jurors convicted Byrd on September
16, 1993.2 Following the recommendation of the jury, 3 the court sentenced
Byrd to ten days in jail, fined him $150, with court costs of $392.75, and
suspended his driver's license for ninety days."'
Byrd made five arguments on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court:
(1) a jury consisting of only six people does not fairly represent the
community; (2) article 2, section 7, of the Arkansas Constitution requires
twelve people on a jury; (3) Act 592 of 1993 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Arkansas Constitution 5 because the Act allows a six-person
jury in misdemeanor cases, but requires a twelve-person jury in felony cases;
(4) because the determination of the number of jurors is a power vested in
6. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 610, 879 S.W.2d at 436.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Before 1993, parties in misdemeanor cases could agree to try their case to a jury
of less than twelve jurors. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-202(b) (Michie 1987). However, in
1993 the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 592 giving judges discretion to impanel six
jurors in misdemeanor cases regardless of the wishes of the parties.Id. § 16-32-202(b)
(Michie 1994). Act 592 was approved on March 19, 1993. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, No. 592,
1993 Ark. Acts 1748 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202, -203 (Michie
1994)). Because the Act had no emergency clause or effective date, it became effective on
August 13, 1993, only one month before Byrd was convicted. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-
149A (June 2, 1993).10. Appellant's Brief at 8, Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994) (No.
CR 94-167).
II. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 610, 879 S.W.2d at 436.
12. Id.
13. Appellant's Brief at 6, Byrd (No. CR 94-167).
14. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 610, 879 S.W.2d at 436. Byrd could have been imprisoned for
up to one year. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-111 (Michie 1993).
15. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 18.
490 [Vol. 18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the Arkansas Supreme Court, 16 the separation-of-powers doctrine 7 prohibits
the legislature from setting the number; and (5) even if the court found Act
592 valid, the trial court judge did not use the discretion required by the
Act."8 Although Byrd presented five arguments for reversal, the court
discussed only the second arguffient in its opinion.
The court found Byrd's second argument persuasive and reversed and
remanded the case.' 9 The court held that Act 592 of 1993 violated article
2, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution and that the two code sections as
amended by Act 592 of 1993 were void.2" As a result of declaring them
16. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § I provides that the judicial power of the State of Arkansas
is vested in the Arkansas Supreme Court.
17. ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
18. Appellant's Brief at 13-14, Byrd (No. CR94-167). The code section amended by
Act 592 provides that "cases other than felonies may be tried, in the discretion of the trial
court judge, by a jury of six (6) jurors." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-202(b) (Michie 1994)
(emphasis added).
19. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 614, 879 S.W. 2d 435, 438 (1994).
20. Id. The void sections of the code read as follows:
16-32-202. Selection, summons, and composition of trial generally.
(a)(1) The jurors for the trial of criminal prosecutions shall be
selected and summoned as provided by law.
(2) Juries shall be composed of twelve (12) jurors.
(b) However, cases other than felonies may be tried, in the
discretion of the trial court judge, by a jury of six (6) jurors.
16-32-203. Selection for misdemeanor trial.
The jury, for the trial of all prosecutions for misdemeanors, shall
be selected in the following manner:
(1) Each party shall have three (3) peremptory challenges, which
may be made orally;
(2) For a twelve (12) person jury, if either party desires a panel
for a twelve-person jury:
(A) The court shall cause the names of twenty-four (24)
competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to be
placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the
names of eighteen (18) shall be drawn and entered on a list in
the order in which they were drawn, and numbered.
(B) Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the list,
from which each may strike the names of three (3) jurors and
return the list so stricken to the judge, who shall strike from the
original list the names struck from the copies.
(C) The first twelve (12) names remaining on the original
list shall constitute the jury;
(3) If the trial court decides on a six-person jury:
(A) The names of only twelve (12) persons shall be drawn
and entered on a list in the order in which they were drawn, and
numbered.
(B) Each party shall be fumished with a copy of the list,
from which each may strike the names of three (3) jurors and
return the list so stricken to the judge, who shall strike from the
1996l
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void, the court announced that the two sections, "as they existed prior to the
enactment of Act 592, remain viable and extant. 21 In summary, the court
original list the names struck from the copies.
(C) The first six (6) names remaining on the original list
shall constitute the jury.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202, -203 (Michie 1994).
21. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 614, 879 S.W.2d at 438. Although section 4 of the Act was a
severability clause, and section 5 repealed the prior law, the court, to have reinstated the prior
provisions, must have found the Act inseverable. Even though this was not discussed in the
opinion, the court did not give effect to either the severability clause or the repealer. To
determine whether an Act is severable, the court looks at the entire act to determine whether
one part would have been enacted without the other. Borchert v. Scott, 248 Ark. 1041, 1049-
50, 460 S.W.2d 28, 33 (1970). The court has "generally held that when a statute is declared
unconstitutional it must be treated as if it had never been passed." Huffman v. Dawkins, 273
Ark. 520, 527, 622 S.W.2d 159, 162 (1981) (citing Morgan v. Cook, 211 Ark. 755, 202
S.W.2d 355 (1947); State v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 176 Ark. 324, 3 S.W.2d 340
(1928); Cochran v. Cobb, 43 Ark. 180 (1884)). Because the Act was inseverable, section
5, which repealed the prior law, could not take effect. Therefore, the code was reinstated as
it was before the Act was passed. The code sections reinstated read as follows:
16-32-202. Selection, summons, and composition of trial generally.
(a) The jurors for the trial of criminal prosecutions shall be
selected and summoned as provided by law. Juries shall be composed
of twelve (12) jurors.
(b) However, cases other than felonies may be tried by a jury of
less than twelve (12) jurors by agreement of the parties.
16-32-203. Selection for misdemeanor trial.
The jury, for the trial of all prosecution for misdemeanors, shall
be selected in the manner provided in the Civil Code for the
formation of a jury in a civil action.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202, -203 (Michie 1987).
In 1995, the General Assembly* again amended the above code sections to
reinstate the parts of the 1993 Act not involving the number of jurors. The new language
of the code sections reads as follows:
16-32-202. Selection, summons, and composition of trial generally.
(a) The jurors for the trial of criminal prosecutions shall be
selected and summoned as provided by law.
(b)(I) Juries shall be composed of twelve (12) jurors.
(2) However, cases other than felonies may be tried by a jury of
less than twelve (12) jurors by agreement of the parties.
16-32-203. Selection for misdemeanor trial.
The jury, for the trial of all prosecutions for misdemeanors, shall
be selected in the following manner:
(1) Each party shall have three (3) peremptory challenges, which
may be made orally; and
(2) (A) The court shall cause the names of twenty-four (24)
competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to be
placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the
names of eighteen (18) jurors shall be drawn and entered on a
list in the order in which they were drawn, and numbered.
(B) Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the list,
from which each may strike the names of three (3) jurors and
[Vol. 18
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held that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution
means that a person charged with any offense has a right to a twelve-person
jury.22
III. BACKGROUND
A. Right to Twelve Jurors Under the United States Constitution
The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed by Article 3,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. 23 The right is also
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.24 Although Byrd
made no argument based on the federal constitutional right to a jury trial,
a discussion of this right is helpful for understanding the Arkansas Supreme
Court's holding. Because the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defen-
dants in state courts, the court might have interpreted the Arkansas
Constitution such that the right to a jury trial protected by the state
constitution is the same as that protected by the United States Constitution.
Although the state high court could not find the state right less protective
than the federal right, it was free to interpret the state right as more
protective than the federal right.
25
return the list so stricken to the judge, who shall strike from the
original list the names struck from the copies.
(C) The first twelve (12) names remaining on the original
list shall constitute the jury.
Act of April 14, 1995, No. 1296, § 61, 1995 Ark. Acts 6303, 6331-32 (codified as amended
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202, -203 (Michie Supp. 1995)).
22. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 610, 879 S.W.2d at 436.
23. This clause reads as follows:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
24. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see I RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6(c) (2d ed. 1992).
1996]
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1. Early United States Supreme Court Decisions on the Jury
Before 1970, the United States Supreme Court had several opportunities
to examine the meaning of the right to a jury trial guaranteed in the
Constitution. The Court consistently held that the meaning of the word
"jury" was the common-law jury with twelve jurors and a unanimous
verdict.26
In Thompson v. Utah,27 an 1898 case, the Court established that the
term "jury" in the Sixth Amendment and Article 3 of the Constitution had
the same meaning as at common law.2" The Court did not consider how the
number of jurors came to be twelve. However, Justice Harlan reasoned that,
because the right to a jury trial granted by the Magna Carta consisted of a
twelve-person jury, those who came from England recognized that guilt
must be determined by twelve jurors.29 If the framers understood that a jury
verdict required the unanimous consent of twelve people, then this must
have been the intended meaning of the right protected in the Constitution.3 °
In another case involving a territory, Rassmussen v. United States,31 the
Court reaffirmed the meaning of the word "jury" in the Constitution. The
primary issue before the Court was whether the Sixth Amendment applied
to Alaskan territorial laws passed by Congress.32 After deciding the
Constitution did apply, the Court held that a statute permitting six-person
juries in misdemeanor cases violated the right to be tried by a common-law
jury, and "was repugnant to the Constitution and void. 33 In this case, there
26. Larry T. Bates, Trial by Jury After Williams v. Florida, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 53,
56-58 (1987).
27. 170 U.S. 343 (1898). Thompson was first convicted by a twelve-person jury when
Utah was a territory under the protection of the Federal Constitution. He was granted a new
trial; however, the second trial was after Utah became a state. He was then tried. by only
eight jurors as provided in the Utah Constitution. Id. at 344. The Court held the state
constitutional provision allowing eight jurors to try cases was an ex post facto law as applied
to crimes committed when Utah was a territory. Id. at 355.
28. Id. at 348-49.
29. Id. at 349-50.
30. Id. Justice Harlan wrote:
It must consequently be taken that the word "jury" and the words "trial by jury"
were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning
affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of
the adoption of that instrument; and that.., the supreme law of the land required
that he should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.
Id. at 350. The Court did not consider whether the State of Utah could reduce the number
of jurors in state courts from twelve to six consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
31. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
32. Id. at 519.
33. Id. at 528.
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was no dispute regarding the number of jurors once the Court decided that
the Constitution controlled.34
Later, in Patton v. United States,35 the United States Supreme Court
concluded it was "not open to question" whether the constitutional guaranty
of trial by jury had the common-law meaning that included a twelve-
member panel and a unanimous verdict.36 The Court considered whether a
defendant could waive the right to a common-law jury in a case in which
one of the jurors had been dismissed because of illness.37 Although the
Court suggested that any number less than twelve could not constitute a
jury,38 it held that because one could waive the right to a jury altogether, a
defendant could waive the right to a twelve-person jury by consenting to
less than twelve jurors.39
Not until 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana,40 did the Court apply the Sixth
Amendment to the states. The Louisiana Constitution provided for jury
trials only in cases where the punishment could be "at hard labor." '41
Because the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor, he was denied a
jury trial.42 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and extends this
right to trials in state courts.43 Although the State argued, and the Court
agreed, that this right does not attach to "petty" offenses,' the Court held
that Duncan's potential for receiving a sentence of two years in prison was
34, Id. at 519.
35. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
36. Id. at 288.
37. Id. at 287. After briefly considering prior cases that established the importance of
the elements of the common-law jury, the Court concluded that the "common law elements
are embedded" in the Constitution and "beyond the authority of the legislative department
to destroy or abridge." Id. at 290.
38. Id. at 292. The Court remarked that "[a] constitutional jury means twelve men as
though that number had been specifically named; and it follows that, when reduced to eleven,
it ceases to be such a jury quite as effectively as though the number had been reduced to a
single person." Id.
39. Id. at 312. The Court disagreed with the preeminent constitutional scholar of the
period who noted that, even if a less number were consented to, the "tribunal would be one
unknown to the law." THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 458-59 (7th ed. 1903).
40. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Id. at 146.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 149, The Court held "that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were they to be tried in a federal court--would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." Id.
44. Id. at 159.
1996]
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not petty.45 Read together, these cases establish that the United States
Constitution guaranteed a twelve-person jury trial in state courts to
defendants accused of non-petty crimes.
2. Williams v. Florida and its Aftermath
Only two years after Duncan, in Williams v. Florida,46 the United
States Supreme Court reconsidered the number of jurors required by the
Constitution. Johnny Williams contested the constitutionality of a Florida
statute that provided for six-person juries in all but capital cases.47 In
considering Williams's claim, the Court criticized the lack of analysis in its
earlier decisions requiring twelve jurors.48 It reexamined the history of the
jury trial and concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not require twelve
jurors. 41 While acknowledging that the common-law jury size was generally
twelve, the Court stated that the number was merely "a historical accident,
unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without
significance 'except to mystics."' 50 The Court also considered the few jury
studies available and concluded there was virtually no difference in the
determination of guilt between six- and twelve-person juries.5 These studies
supported the Court's decision that, because the purpose of the jury was not
necessarily a function of its size, twelve jurors were not constitutionally
45. Id. at 161-62. The Court was unwilling to establish a maximum sentence for non-
petty offenses in Duncan; however, in Baldwin v. New York, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right controls when a defendant might be imprisoned for more than six months.
399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). Baldwin was handed down the same day as Williams v. Florida.
46. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
47. Id. at 79-80.
48. Id. at 90-92.
49. Id. at 86.
50. Id. at 102. The Court noted these "mystical" explanations for the requirement of
twelve jurors:
John Proffatt in his treatise on jury trials notes that the reasons why the number
of the petit jury is 12, are "quaintly given" in Duncombe's Trials per Pais, as
follows:
"[T]his number is no less esteemed by our own law than by holy
writ. If the twelve apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in
our eternal state, good reason hath the law to appoint the number
twelve to try us in our temporal. The tribes of Israel were twelve,
the patriarchs were twelve, and Solomon's officers were twelve."
Trial by Jury 112 n.4 (1877), quoting G. Duncombe, I Trials per Pais 92-93 (8th ed.
1766).
Id. at 88-89 n.23.
5 1. Id. at 10 1-02. The Court stated that "neither currently available evidence nor theory
suggests that the 12-man jury is necessarily more advantageous to the defendant than a jury
composed of fewer members." Id.
[Vol. 18
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required.52 The Court emphasized, however, that its holding did not affect
the states' right to continue to require twelve-person juries.5 3
Because the bright line requiring twelve jurors was removed, it was
inevitable one would ask how few jurors one could have. If the common-
law jury of twelve jurors was not required by the Constitution, what about
the unanimity requirement for twelve or fewer jurors? Later cases gave the
Court the opportunity to address these issues.
The State of Georgia permitted juries of five persons to try misde-
meanor cases. 4 Claude Ballew was convicted of a misdemeanor before a
five-person jury in Georgia and challenged the constitutionality of the size
of the jury. 5 The Court lamented the little evidence on the effectiveness of
juries when it decided Williams eight years earlier. 6 However, from the
results of studies generated by Williams, the Court conceded that smaller
juries deliberate less effectively,57 smaller juries are more likely to convict
52. Id. at 101. The number of jurors should be "large enough to promote group
deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for
obtaining a representative cross-section of the community." Id. at 100. At least one
commentator was concerned by the method the Court used to reach its conclusion: "The
majority did not even suggest a reason for lowering the requirement from twelve down at
least as far as six, but rested instead on a questionable critique of the reasons for holding the
line at twelve." The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Right to Twelve-Man Jury:
Constitutionality of Pretrial Prosecutorial Discovery, 84 HARV. L. REV. 165, 167 (1970).
53. Williams, 399 U.S. at 103. "Our holding does no more than leave these
considerations to Congress and the States, unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment that would forever dictate the precise number that can constitute a jury." Id.
In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan dissented in Baldwin, and concurred in the result in
Williams. Id. at 117. He was concerned that twelve jurors would not be required on federal
juries. Justice Harlan indicated the Court "dilut[ed] constitutional protections" with an
argument that was "much too thin to mask the true thrust" of the decision in Williams;
namely, that the "'incorporationist' view of the Due Process Clause ... must be tempered
to allow the States more elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems." Id. at 118
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 226 (1978).
55. Id. at 226-27.
56. Id. at 230-31. The Court recognized that because "little empirical research had
evaluated jury performance" when Williams was decided, "the [Williams] Court found no
evidence that the reliability of jury verdicts diminished with six-member panels." Id. at 230.
However, the Court noted of the Williams decision:
[It] generated a quantity of scholarly work on jury size. These writings do not
draw or identify a bright line below which the number of jurors would not be able
to function as required by the standards enunciated in Williams. On the other
hand, they raise significant questions about the wisdom and constitutionality of
a reduction below six.
Id. at 231-32 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 232-34. Less effective deliberation results in "inaccurate fact-finding and
incorrect application of the common sense of the community to the facts." Id. at 232.
1996]
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innocent persons,5 and a cross-section of the community may not be
represented by smaller juries.5 9 After comparing the cost to defendants with
the slight benefits to the State in allowing less than six jurors,' the Court
decided that a five-person jury did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
requirements for a jury trial.61
The unanimity requirement of the common-law jury was questioned in
Johnson v. Louisiana62 and Apodaca v. Oregon,63 a pair of opinions handed
down the same day. The petitioners in Apodaca were convicted by non-
unanimous twelve-person juries in Oregon.' The Court likened the
unanimity requirement to the twelve-person requirement of the common-law
jury in that unanimity does not "materially contribute" to the function of the
jury.65 Petitioners argued non-unanimous verdicts weakened the reasonable
doubt standard, but the Court noted the standard did not arise from the Sixth
Amendment.' The Court decided Johnson on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the defendant was convicted before the Court's holding
in Duncan.67 Because the Sixth Amendment did not apply to his case, the
Court considered whether Johnson's conviction by a non-unanimous jury
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court explained the Due Process Clause never required
unanimous jury verdicts,' and the Louisiana statute allowing non-unanimous
verdicts by twelve jurors satisfied the Equal Protection Clause because it had
a rational relationship to state objectives.69 In these two cases, the Court
58. Id. at 234-35. The possibility of acquitting a guilty person is greater with a larger
jury, therefore "an optimal jury size can be selected as a function of the interaction between
the two risks." Id. at 234. One study concluded "the optimal jury size was between six and
eight." Id.
59. Id. at 236-37.
60. Id. at 243. There are substantial savings in utilizing six rather than twelve jurors,
but there is little effect on backlogs and trial time. Id. at 244.
61. Id. at 245. Although most of the jury studies compared six- and twelve-member
juries, the Court admitted it "[did] not pretend to discern a clear line between six members
and five." Id. at 239.
62. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
63. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 405-06. The Oregon defendants were convicted by votes of ten-to-two and
eleven-to-one, representing 83% and 92% of the juries respectively. Id. at 406.
65. Id. at 410.
66. Id. at 411. The Court noted that "the rule requiring proof of crime beyond a
reasonable doubt did not crystallize in this country until after the Constitution was adopted."
Id.
67. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1970). Johnson was convicted by a
nine-to-three vote of the jury, or 75%, prior to the holding in Duncan; thus, the Sixth
Amendment did not apply to his case. Id. at 358.
68. Id. at 359.
69. Id. at 363. Charles Torcia summarized the Court's holding: "[A] classification
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upheld non-unanimous verdicts and allowed as little as seventy-five percent
and eighty-three percent agreement on twelve-person juries.
The next logical question was whether unanimity was required in juries
with less than twelve members. In another Louisiana case, Burch v.
Louisiana,7" the Court concluded that a non-unanimous verdict by a six-
person jury violated the right to a jury trial protected by the Sixth Amend-
ment.7' Although seventy-five percent of a twelve-member jury proved
sufficient,72 eighty-three percent of a six-member jury did not. The Court
admitted difficulty in justifying the decision, 73 but indicated a need to draw
the line somewhere. 74 Because only two states allowed non-unanimous
verdicts with six jurors, the Court concluded this would be a good place to
draw the line."
Michael Wayne Byrd, the defendant in Byrd v. State,76 had a federal
constitutional right to a trial by jury in an Arkansas court. 77 However,
because Byrd was convicted by a unanimous six-person jury, his federal
rights were not violated. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of constitutional rights establishes a minimum level of protection that the
states must afford. Therefore, the states are free to provide their citizens
with equal or greater protection under their state constitutions.
B. Right to Twelve Jurors Under the Constitutions of the Sister States
When presented with the task of interpreting Arkansas law, the
Arkansas Supreme Court frequently considers the interpretation and
scheme which allows guilt to be predicated on a less-than-unanimous verdict in the case of
some offenses, but requires unanimity in the case of more serious offenses, is not violative
of the Equal Protection Clause.". 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 387 (13th ed. 1991).
70. 441 U.S. 130 (1979). Petitioner was convicted by a jury vote of five-to-one, or
83%. Id. at 132.
71. Id. at 134.
72. See supra note 67.
73. Burch, 441 U.S. at 137. The Court noted it did not "pretend the ability to discern
a priori a bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the
verdict would not permit the jury to function in the manner required." Id.
74. Id. at 137.
75. Id. at 138. Justice Rehnquist noted that "this near-uniform judgment of the Nation
provides a useful guide in delimiting the line between those jury practices that are
constitutionally permissible and those that are not." Id.
76. 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).
77. The maximum prison sentence for the first DWI offense is one year. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-65-111 (Michie 1993). Therefore, under Baldwin v. New York, the offense is non-




application of similar provisions in sister states. Although the court is by
no means bound by these interpretations, it has found persuasive the
reasoning and results reached by other courts of last resort.78 Indeed, in
Byrd v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court was persuaded by the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation of a state constitutional provision similar to
article 2, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution.79 Therefore, this note
considers the decisions of several state courts of last resort interpreting the
right to a jury trial under their state constitutions.
The state constitutional treatment of the composition of juries varies
greatly. Under the current interpretation of the federal right to a jury trial,
the United States Constitution extends to defendants neither the right to a
twelve-member jury nor a unanimous verdict, unless there are only six
jurors. However, some state constitutions specifically provide for a
unanimous verdict by twelve jurors in courts of record. 80 Other states give
power to the legislature to regulate the jury.81 Almost every state constitu-
tion has broad language guaranteeing the inviolate right to a trial by jury.82
However, the language concerning juries in a few state constitutions,
including the Constitution of Arkansas, has only broad language, which
neither specifies the number of jurors nor specifically allows for legislation
regarding this right.83
78. See, e.g., Jones v. Brinkman, 200 Ark. 583, 587, 139 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1940);
Springfield v. Fulk, 96 Ark. 316, 319, 131 S.W. 694, 695 (1910) (finding interpretation of
similar statutes from other states persuasive but not binding).
79. See infra part IV.A.
80. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, xi(b) (providing for twelve jurors, yet allowing
the legislature to determine the number in inferior courts); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (allowing
the legislature to provide for less than twelve jurors in courts not of record and non-
unanimous verdicts in civil cases); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 18 (requiring twelve unanimous
jurors in circuit courts); W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14 (providing for twelve jurors in criminal
cases).
81. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (requiring twelve jurors in felony prosecutions,
allowing legislature to determine the number of jurors greater than or equal to six in all other
cases); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 18 (allowing legislature to determine composition of juries in
non-indictable offenses).
82. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 23; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16; CONN. CONST. art.
1, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 9; NEB.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 2,
§ 19; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 6; TEX. CONST.
art. 1, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
83. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § I1; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights
§ 7; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 12.
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Before the Supreme Court's decisions in Williams,8 most of the state
high courts considering the number of jurors required by their state
constitutions held that twelve unanimous jurors were required for a verdict
in criminal cases. 85 The opinions, though, are subject to the same criticism
that the United States Supreme Court leveled at its earlier decisions. Just
as in the early United States Supreme Court cases, the state courts accepted
without question that, by definition, a jury was composed of twelve persons
who must render a unanimous verdict.'s After the United States Supreme
Court decided Williams v. Florida and the cases following, a number of
states reconsidered the interpretation of their own constitutions in light of
the new understanding of the Sixth Amendment. The results are mixed.
Ohio's constitution, for example, does not specify the number of jurors,
but the Supreme Court of Ohio previously held that its constitution required
twelve jurors.8 7 In Work v. State,8 8 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
statute authorizing conviction by a jury of six violated the state's constitu-
tion. One hundred twenty-six years later, the court implicitly overruled its
holding in Work. In State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Boyland,89 the court
held that a rule of criminal procedure providing for eight-person juries in
misdemeanor cases9' did not violate the constitution. The court reasoned
that it could regulate the number of jurors because it is a procedural rather
than a substantive issue.9' Furthermore, the substantive federal right
discussed in Williams and Ballew was not altered by the court's rule.92 The
Boyland decision may be distinguished from the Work decision. In Boyland
the court was exercising its constitutional power, whereas in Work the
legislature exceeded its power under the state constitution.
84. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See supra notes 46-75 and accompanying text, for a discussion
of the Williams decision and subsequent cases interpreting Williams.
85. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 6 Blackf. 461 (Ind. 1843); State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 439
(1869); Byrd v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Howard) 163 (1835); Doebler v. Commonwealth, 3 Serg.
& Rawle 237 (Penn. 1817). But see State v. Bates, 47 P. 78 (Utah 1896) (holding that the
Constitution of Utah providing for trial by eight jurors, except in capital cases, did not violate
the United States Constitution).
86. See, e.g., Territory of N.M. v. Ortiz, 42 P. 87 (1895).
87. OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 5 states: "The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate ... "
88. 2 Ohio St. 296 (1853). The court held that "[t]he number must be twelve, they
must be impartially selected, and must unanimously concur in the guilt of the accused before
a conviction can be had." Id. at 304.
89. 391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979).
90. OHIo R. CRiM. P. 23(B).
91. Boyland, 391 N.E.2d at 326.
92. Id. The court reasoned that the rule allowing only eight jurors "merely prescribes
the method by which the substantive right is to be exercised." Id.
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Massachusetts also has a constitutional provision protecting the right to
a jury trial.93 In 1971, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued
an advisory opinion to the governor holding that a statute allowing six-
person juries in misdemeanor criminal cases would not violate that state's
constitution.94 Interpreting the state constitution, the court agreed with the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida.
Although the term "jury" was understood at the time of the framers to mean
twelve people, the court suggested that the framers did not intend for the
meaning of constitutional terms to be immutable.95 The majority was
convinced the number of jurors was not an essential attribute of the trial by
jury.96 However, one of the justices dissented because the ancient history
of twelve jurors indicated the legislature could not reduce the number.97
Not all states have followed the Williams holding. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, interpreting the state constitution98 in Advisory Opinion to
the Senate,99 rejected the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Williams. The Rhode Island legislature proposed to reduce the number of
petit jurors to six, but the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held to do so
would violate the state constitution."° First, the court considered the history
of the jury trial in Rhode Island from the first settlers of the New World." 1
Then, the court noted the considerable body of case law around the nation
requiring twelve impartial, unanimous jurors for a valid verdict. 10 2  In
contrast to the United States Supreme Court in Williams, this court refused
to accept that the requirement of twelve jurors under that state's constitution
93. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12 provides in part: "[T]he legislature shall not make any
law, that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the
government of the army and navy, without trial by jury."
94. Opinion of the Justices, 271 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1971).
95. Id. at 339. The court suggested that the framers did not intend to "freeze for all
time by constitutional mandate the details of all then existing practice, or that they gave any
significant attention to the particular number of jurors." Id.
96. Id. at 340.
97. Id. at 341 (Quirico, J., dissenting). The justice found persuasive a history "of
almost six centuries when trial by jury has meant trial by a jury of twelve unless the persons
entitled to such a trial agreed otherwise." Id. (Quirico, J., dissenting).
98. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 15 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
In civil cases the general assembly may fix the size of the petit jury at less than twelve but
not less than six."
99. 278 A.2d 852 (R.I. 1971).
100. Id. at 853.
101. Id. at 855-57. In 1639 a "Portsmouth ordinance provided for trials by a jury of
twelve." Id. at 855. Although some municipalities during the colonial period used six-
person juries, "juries of twelve were required at all trials conducted in the General Court."
Id. at 856.
102. Id. at 857.
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was a "historical accident."' 3 The opinion, however, was not unanimous.
Justice Roberts, in dissent, expressed the opinion that the question was not
whether the framers understood that a common-law jury was composed of
twelve people. Instead, the question was whether the constitution prohibited
the legislature from determining the number of jurors."° Considering the
history of legislation regarding the number of jurors, Justice Roberts
concluded it was wholly within the power of the legislature to determine this
number. 105
In State v. Hamm,106 a case on which the Arkansas Supreme Court
relied for its holding in Byrd, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed its
pre-Williams case law in striking down a statute allowing six-person juries
in misdemeanor cases. °7 The court reasoned it was not for the courts or the
legislature to change the meaning of the constitution.'0 8 If the people
wished to change the requirement of twelve jurors, they could do this only
by amending the constitution. 109
103. Id. at 858.
104. Id. at 860 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 861 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts concluded his lengthy dissent:
I am of the opinion, then, that the Carolinian Charter of 1663 vested the
Legislature of the colony with the power to prescribe the numerical constitution
of a petit jury; that this power passed to the Legislature of this state at the time
of our Declaration of Independence on May 4, 1776, and was exercised by the
Legislature of this state until the adoption of our constitution in 1842; that the
provisions of the inviolate clause, section 15 of article I, of our constitution
neither expressly nor by necessary implication prohibit the exercise of that power
by the Legislature pursuant to the provisions of article IV, section 10, of our
constitution; and that, therefore, the question propounded to us should be
answered in the negative as to both the Federal Constitution and the constitution
of this state.
Id. at 866 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
106. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988) (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 386. The court reasoned:
[A]lthough our constitution does not specifically spell out the number required to
constitute a jury, this court has done so in its decision in Everett. Therefore, a
12-person jury is written into the constitution by decision of this court as if it
were expressly stated in the original constitution itself.
Id. at 382 (citing State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 439 (1869)).
108. Id. at 383.
109. In 1988 the people of Minnesota followed the recommendation of their high court
and amended the state's constitution. As amended, the constitution provides for twelve jurors
in felony cases, but in all others the legislature may "provide for the number of jurors,
provided that a jury have at least six members." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (amended 1988).
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C. The Right to Twelve Jurors under the Arkansas Constitution
The issue was first addressed in Arkansas in the 1848 case of Larillian
v. Lane & Co. "0 In that case, the record showed that twelve jurors tried the
case, but only eleven names were recorded on the verdict."' The court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court because the issue of the number
of jurors was not preserved properly for appeal.12 However, in dictum, the
court explained that the constitutional jury is the common-law jury
consisting of twelve persons." 3
The same year, in State v. Cox,' the court considered the constitution-
ality of an Act that created jurisdiction for justices of the peace." 5 Section
11 of the Act provided for six-person juries in the courts of justices of the
peace. Once again, the issue of jury size was not properly before the
court. ' 6 Nevertheless, the court indicated that the right to a trial by jury
meant a right to be tried by twelve jurors."17 In 1851, the court overruled
State v. Cox and invalidated the entire Act on the grounds that it conflicted
with the requirement for presentment and indictment in section 14 of the
Arkansas Constitution's Bill of Rights." 8
In a railroad case in 1877, the supreme court again commented on the
meaning of the word "jury." "9 Although this too was dictum, the court
110. 8 Ark. 372 (1848).
111. Id. at 373.
112. Id. at 374.
113. Id. at 374-75. The court stated:
The trial by jury is a great constitutional right, and when the convention
incorporated the provision into the constitution of the country, they most
unquestionably had reference to the jury trial as known and recognized by the
common law. It is a well ascertained fact, that the common law jury consisted
of twelve men, and as a necessary consequence, since the constitution is silent
upon the subject, the conclusion is irresistible that the framers of that instrument
intended to require the same number.
Id.
.114. 8 Ark. 436 (1848), overruled in part on other grounds by Eason v. State, 11 Ark.
481 (1851).
115. Act of Dec. 16th, 1846, 1846 Ark. Acts 58 (defining jurisdiction of justices of the
peace).
116. Cox, 8 Ark. at 446-47. The court conceded "[t]his question does not properly
present itself in the present case, but we have deemed it proper to say thus much upon it, for
the guidance of justices of the peace in the exercise of the new jurisdiction with which they
have been invested." Id. at 447.
117. Id. In dictum, the court wrote: "The constitutional provision securing the right of
trial by a jury means a jury of twelve men, according to the known technical meaning of the
term." Id.
118. Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481, 486 (1851).
119. Cairo & Fulton R.R. v. Trout, 32 Ark. 17, 24-25 (1877).
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continued to define the constitutional jury as a body of twelve persons.120
The court reviewed an Act requiring a five-member commission to assess
damage to property caused by railroads. 21 It upheld the Act against a
challenge that it violated the 1836 Constitution because the right to a trial
by jury was not an issue in the case. 122
In 1886, in Warwick v. State,123 the court considered the number of
jurors required by the current constitution. In the trial court, the defendant
was charged with selling alcohol to a minor. 24 After the evidence was
presented and the jury instructions were read, the judge realized that only
eleven jurors had been impaneled, so he ordered an additional juror to be
added.125  After Warwick objected to the addition of a juror, the court
permitted the eleven jurors to retire and consider their verdict.' 26 The jury
found Warwick guilty.'27 On appeal, the State argued the defendant waived
his right to twelve jurors when he objected to the addition of a juror. 2 The
defendant argued he could not, and did not, constitutionally waive the right
to twelve jurors. 129 Although the court cited previous cases interpreting the
word "jury" as meaning twelve men, it held that, because a jury could be
waived altogether, one could consent to be tried by less than twelve
jurors. 30 Here, however, the defendant did not consent to fewer jurors by
objecting to the addition of a juror. 13 Instead, the court held that the trial
judge should have impaneled a new twelve-person jury. 132
In 1917 the Arkansas General Assembly enacted a law providing for
a non-unanimous jury verdict in civil cases.'33 The Act was held unconstitu-
120. Id. at 25. "The word 'jury' is here used in its common law sense, and means
twelve men, and the Legislature cannot abridge the number." Id. (citing State v. Cox, 8 Ark.
446 (1848)). The court noted the right to a jury trial was not related to "cases of the kind
now under consideration." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 47 Ark. 568, 2 S.W. 335 (1886).
124. Id. at 569, 2 S.W. at 336.
125. Id. at 569-70, 2 S.W. at 336.
126. Id. at 570, 2 S.W. at 336.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 571, 2 S.W. at 336.
129. Id. at 570, 2 S.W. at 336.
130. Id. at 570-71, 2 S.W. at 336, "The trial jury still consists of twelve, unless the
prisoner consents to be tried by a less number." Id. at 570, 2 S.W. at 336. It is interesting
that this court reached the same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court would 44
years later in Patton v. United States. See supra part III.A. I.
131. Warwick, 47 Ark. at 572, 2 S.W. at 337.
132. Id.
133. Act of Feb. 8, 1917, 1917 Ark. Acts 229. Section 1 of the Act provided that "in
civil cases the verdict of any nine of the jurymen trying the cause shall be accepted as the
verdict of the jury." Id. at 230.
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tional in Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks34 the same year it was
enacted. The court found its previous decisions on the meaning of jury had
"settle[d] beyond controversy" that a constitutional jury must consist of
twelve impartial, unanimous jurors. 35 In dissent, Chief Justice McCulloch
argued that the silence of the constitution on the number of jurors and the
unanimity for a verdict suggested the legislature could regulate such
matters. 136 Chief Justice McCulloch viewed constitutions as "declarations
of principles and not specifications of details."'137 While acknowledging that
virtually every case discussing the point accepted the requirement of twelve
unanimous jurors, the Chief Justice disagreed with their holdings and would
not have followed them. 38 Instead, he understood that the framers intended
to allow the law to grow and develop rather than to fix the meaning of the
constitutional jury as it was when the Arkansas Constitution was adopted. 139
On November 6, 1928, the people of Arkansas amended article 2,
section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution to allow non-unanimous verdicts in
civil cases." The amended section was first interpreted by the Arkansas
134. 130 Ark. 264, 197 S.W. 280 (1917).
135. Id. at 266-67, 197 S.W. at 281.
136. Id. at 270, 197 S.W. at 282 (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 271, 197 S.W. at 283 (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice McCulloch
wrote:
The Declaration of Rights embodied in the Constitution merely provides that "the
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." It does not specify what number of
men shall constitute a jury, nor how the verdict shall be rendered. That is left,
by the silence of the Constitution on the subject, to legislative regulations. The
purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to preserve, in this State, the
principle of trial by jury, and not to prescribe any particular form by which the
remedy shall be applied. There is no magic in particular numbers, and it is
difficult for me to believe that those who inserted the declaration of principles
into our organic law intended to hamper the Legislature in reforming legal
procedure from time to time so as to keep pace with advanced thought. Any
other view constitutes the worship of mere form inltead of preserving a principle.
Id. at 270, 197 S.W. at 282 (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice commented:
I am of course, aware of the fact that nearly all of the courts which have passed
on the question, held that a constitutional guaranty of the right of trial by jury
means a trial by a jury of twelve, and a unanimous verdict, according to the
practice at common law. But I think the decisions are wrong. They follow each
other blindly, and it seems to me to be the time to stop. Decisions on that subject
do not become rules of property, and there is no obligation to follow them when
found to be wrong.
Id. at 271, 197 S.W. at 283 (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 270-71, 197 S.W. at 282 (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting).
140. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7 stated: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,
and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury
trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law." However,
the text was changed in 1928 by Amendment 16 to read as follows:
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Supreme Court in a civil case, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Philbrick.4'
In this case the trial judge, over the defendant's objection, decided to allow
a trial before eleven jurors after one of the twelve jurors was excused. 42
The supreme court reversed because, although the court recognized that only
nine jurors had to agree on a civil verdict, twelve jurors were required by
the language of the constitution.1
4 1
Although the state constitutional requirement of twelve jurors seemed
settled, the 1993 the General Assembly sought to relax the requirement by
allowing six jurors in misdemeanor cases." The law was challenged in
1994 when the Arkansas Supreme Court was asked once again to interpret
the Arkansas constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury
in a criminal case. The court had several cases on which to rely. These
cases included the court's own decisions and the decisions of other states
that were handed down both before and after the United States Supreme
Court decision of Williams v. Florida.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN BYRD V. STATE
In Byrd v. State,'45 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Act 592 of 1993, which gave discretionary authority to
trial judges to impanel juries of six people to decide misdemeanor cases. 146
Byrd was tried and convicted by a six-person jury. 147  He argued his
conviction was invalid because the Act violated article 2, section 7 of the
Arkansas Constitution. 148 Six justices agreed with Byrd and reversed his
conviction. 149
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at
law, without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law; and in all jury trials
in civil cases, where as many as nine of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the
verdict so agreed upon shall be returned as the verdict of such jury, provided,
however, that where a verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors all the jurors
consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added).
141. 189 Ark. 1082, 76 S.W.2d 97 (1934).
142. Id. at 1083, 76 S.W.2d at 97.
143. Id. at 1084-85, 76 S.W.2d at 97-98. Without discussing how it reached this
conclusion, the court announced that "[t]his amendment to the Constitution clearly recognizes
that a jury must consist of twelve jurors." Id. at 1084, 76 S.W.2d at 97.
144. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-202(b) (Michie 1994).
145. 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).
146. Id. at 610, 879 S.W.2d at 436.
147. Id.
148. Appellant's Abstract and Opening Brief at 13-14, Byrd (No. CR 94-167).




The court first focused on the meaning of the word "jury" in article 2,
section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution.150 The term "jury" had been defined
previously by the court as a fact-finding body of twelve people.' Two
cases so holding, Larillian v. Lane & Co.'52 and State v. Cox,'53 were
decided before the adoption of the 1874 Constitution. From these cases, the
court reasoned that both the framers and voters adopting the new Arkansas
Constitution in 1874 must have understood that a jury was composed of
twelve people." The court then considered a case decided after the
adoption of the current constitution. In Warwick v. State,' a misdemeanor
conviction was overturned because the jury consisted of only eleven
persons. 56 Finally, in 1928 when the people of Arkansas amended article
2, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution to allow for jury verdicts in civil
cases where nine jurors agree, the court reasoned the people must have
understood a jury was composed of twelve people. 57
Next, the court considered the United States Supreme Court decision
in Williams v. Florida.5' The Arkansas court was not persuaded by the
Court's reasoning and decided instead to follow the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision in State v. Hamm. 59 Agreeing with the reasoning in Hamm,
the court explained that to allow the legislature to decrease the size of the
jury would be "to erode the fundamental right of trial by jury under our
system of state government without a vote of the people."' 60
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Hays would have held Act 592 constitutional because there is
a strong presumption of constitutionality for legislative acts' 6' and because
150. See supra note 140.
151. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 611-12, 879 S.W.2d at 436-37.
152. 8 Ark. 372 (1848).
153. 8 Ark. 436 (1848), overruled on other grounds by Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481(1851).
154. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 612, 879 S.W.2d at 437.
155. 47 Ark. 568, 2 S.W. 335 (1886).
156. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 612, 879 S.W.2d at 437.
157. Id. at 613, 879 S.W.2d at 437.
158. Id. (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). For a discussion of the
Williams line of cases, see supra part III.A.2.
159. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 613, 879 S.W.2d at 437-38 (citing and discussing State v. Hamm,
423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988)).
160. Id. at 614, 879 S.W.2d at 438.
161. Id. at 614-15, 879 S.W.2d at 438 (Hays, J., dissenting) (citing Arnold v. Kemp, 306
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the constitutional provision in question did not specify the number of
jurors.162 Even though the framers may have understood that a common-law
jury was composed of twelve jurors, Justice Hays noted the common law is
susceptible to change. 163  He agreed with Chief Justice McCulloch's
dissenting opinion in Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks'64 that the
determination of the number of jurors should be left to the legislature. 165
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court has established beyond question that a
defendant in a criminal case has a right to be tried by twelve jurors.
Although in civil trials the Arkansas Constitution provides for non-
unanimous verdicts, dicta in the case law strongly suggests that a unanimous
verdict is required in criminal cases. This issue was not properly before the
court in Byrd, but the court's reliance on a long history of interpreting the
term "jury" to mean twelve unanimous jurors indicates it would not permit
the legislature to eliminate the requirement of unanimous verdicts. Although
statutes are presumed constitutional, the court will not be reluctant to strike
down a legislative act that restricts a right as old and fundamental as the
right to a trial by jury.
The court adopted an interpretation that will prove costly to the State
of Arkansas. The cost of impaneling twelve jurors is greater than the cost
for six jurors. In Ballew v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court
accepted that there are substantial savings in using six jurors instead of
twelve."6 In addition to the direct cost, there may be indirect costs
associated with larger juries. With more jurors, there is a greater likelihood
for hung juries.'6 7 This, in turn, increases the cost to the state for retrying
cases. Because of the higher cost, a prosecutor may decide not to retry the
less serious cases. Furthermore, as jury size increases, the chance of
acquitting a guilty defendant increases. 6 s This implies another cost: the
cost to society of releasing possibly guilty defendants.
Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991)).
162. Id. at 615, 879 S.W.2d at 438 (Hays, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Hays, J., dissenting) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Dinick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)).
164. 130 Ark. 264, 270, 197 S.W. 280, 282 (1917) (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting).
165. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 616, 879 S.W.2d at 439 (Hays, J., dissenting).
166. 435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978).
167. Id. at 236.
168. Id. at 234.
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On the other hand, as the size of the jury decreases, it is more likely
that an innocent defendant will be convicted. In Byrd, the court
recognized that the cost to innocent defendants of the increased risk of
conviction of a serious crime is greater than the benefit to the state in
savings associated with fewer jurors. 70 However, as the seriousness of the
offense decreases, this cost may be outweighed by the benefit to the state.
These conflicting interests could have been balanced properly by
permitting the General Assembly to provide for six person juries in petty
offenses-crimes in which the potential for imprisonment is less than six
months.' This scheme would protect the rights of those accused of even
minor offenses by affording them both a bench trial in municipal court and
a jury trial de novo before a six-person jury in circuit court.' 2 Although the
savings to the state would not be as great as they would have been under
Act 592 of 1993, there would be some savings to the state. An act allowing
six-person juries in petty cases might have been constitutional because the
169. Id. at 235. For a discussion of the increased probability of conviction in smaller
juries, see David F. Walbert, Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction:
An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 529, 545-47 (1971).
170. The majority noted that "[a] panel of six jurors for misdemeanor trials may seem
economical and, therefore, desirable at first blush because less serious offenses are involved.
However, many misdemeanors including the DWI offense at hand are serious and carry with
them maximum jail terms of one year and substantial fines." Byrd, 317 Ark. at 614, 879
S.W.2d at 438.
171. This would be in accordance with the recommendations of the American Bar
Association. The Association recommends twelve unanimous jurors in all non-petty
prosecutions. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 15-1.1 (2d ed. 1980). This
standard provides:
Jury trial should be available to a party, including the state, in criminal
prosecutions in which confinement in jail or prison may be imposed. The jury
should consist of twelve persons, except that a jury of less than twelve (but not
less than six) may be provided when the penalty that may be imposed is
confinement for six months or less. The verdict of the jury should be unanimous.
The comments to the standard note that "[tihe size of a jury - so long as there
are at least six members - is generally a matter for each state to decide, although
'a jury of twelve' is recommended in all cases in which the sixth amendment
right to jury trial attaches." Regarding the unanimity of the verdict, the comment
points to studies from which "it would appear that defendants fare less well under
a less than unanimous verdict system, although the statistics are not conclusive
on this point because it is not known how defendants whose trials end in a hung
jury fare, as a group, on retrial."
Id. at 15.15 (citations omitted).
172. The Arkansas Constitution protects the right to jury trial in all criminal cases. ARK.
CONST. art. 2, §§ 7, 10. Although no jury trial is provided for in municipal courts,
defendants have an almost absolute right to a trial de novo in circuit court. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-17-703 (Michie 1994). This right is limited to defendants who perfect their
appeal under Arkansas Inferior Court Rule 9. Edwards v. City of Conway, 300 Ark. 135,
138, 777 S.W.2d 583, 584 (1989).
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court in Byrd was not presented with the question whether a twelve-person
jury is required in such cases. The court could have limited to non-petty
cases their holding that the Arkansas Constitution requires twelve jurors.
The court was unlikely to choose this course because it suggested in
Byrd that the Arkansas Constitution would have to be changed to allow for
fewer jurors. 73 In a recent case the court foreclosed the possibility of six-
person juries when it decided Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff.7  In Grinning,
the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to
arrest. 75 Although both of the crimes are truly petty offenses,176 the court
reversed and remanded because of the holding in Byrd v. State.'
7
Fortunately, the possibility of changing the Arkansas Constitution is not
too remote for serious consideration. There is a movement to modernize the
state's aging constitution through a constitutional convention.'78 This would
give the people of the state the opportunity to say what they mean by "trial
by jury." Either a constitutional amendment or a convention79 should
consider specifying the requirements for unanimity of verdict and number
of jurors or setting minimum requirements and giving the General Assembly
or the Arkansas Supreme Court the power to regulate these details.'8 0
173. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 614, 879 S.W.2d at 438.
174. 322 Ark. 45, 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995) (4-3 decision).
175. Id. at 47, 907 S.W.2d at 690. Disorderly conduct is only a class C misdemeanor.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-207(b) (Michie 1993). Resisting arrest is a class B misdemeanor.
Id. § 5-54-103(b)(4) (Michie 1993).
176. A petty offense is one where the maximum penalty is confinement for six months
or less. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Betty Lou Grinning faced only a
maximum of 120 days confinement for the class B and C misdemeanors. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-401(b)(2)-(3) (Michie 1993). Justices Glaze and Brown and Chief Justice Jesson
dissented because there was no objection to the six person jury at the time of trial. Grinning,
322 Ark. at 51, 907 S.W.2d at 693 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
177. Grinning, 322 Ark. at.49-50, 907 S.W.2d at 692.
178. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives of the 80th General Assembly
proposed a convention because "many of the provisions of the Arkansas Constitution of
1874, as amended, are not reasonable or appropriate at the present time and do not reflect
the needs of a modem and vital state government and should be revised." H.R. 1302, 80th
Ark. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 1 (1995); S. 247, 80th Ark. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (1995).
179. On December 12, 1995, Arkansas voters rejected a proposed constitutional
convention. Rachel O'Neal, Voters Say No to Convention, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec.
13, 1995, at IA.
180. Governor Tucker's proposed Arkansas Constitution provided for unanimous verdicts
in criminal trials, and would allow the legislature to provide for six-person juries in
misdemeanor cases. JIM Guy TUCKER, THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION OF 1996: A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY art. 2 § 5 (1995), also available
on the Internet from the Arkansas World Wide Web Homepage at
http://www.state.ar.us/proposed_constitution/constit.html. Although purporting to be
"substantially similar to Article 2, Section 7, and Amendment 16 of the 1874 Constitution,"
1996]
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The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Byrd v. State is firmly
rooted in reason and precedent. The court refused to allow the legislature
to infringe Byrd's right to have a twelve-person jury decide his guilt.
However, truly petty offenses should be tried by only six jurors. After the
decision in Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, the only way to allow six-person
juries in any criminal cases is for the people to change the constitution
through convention or amendment.
Timothy N. Holthoff
the proposed article is significantly less restrictive than the Arkansas Supreme Court's
interpretation of Article 2, Section 7, and even less restrictive than the guidelines suggested
by the American Bar Association. Id. cmt. to art. 2, § 5. See also supra note 171 and
accompanying text.
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